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Constitutional Myths and Realities
Stephen Markman
Justice,
Michigan Supreme Court
The United States has
enjoyed unprecedented liberty, prosperity and stability, in
large part because of its Constitution. I would like to discuss
a number of myths or misconceptions concerning that inspired
document. |
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Myth or Misconception 1: Public
policies of which we approve are constitutional and public policies
of which we disapprove are unconstitutional.
It might be
nice if those policies that we favor were compelled by the
Constitution and those policies that we disfavor were barred by the
Constitution. But this is not, by and large, what the Constitution
does. Rather, the Constitution creates an architecture of government
that is designed to limit the abuse of governmental power. The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 sought to create
a government that would be effective in carrying out its essential
tasks, such as foreign policy and national defense, while not coming
to resemble those European governments with which they were so
familiar, where the exercise of governmental power was arbitrary and
without limits. Therefore, while the Constitution constrains
government, it does not generally seek to replace the representative
processes of government.
Governments may, and often do, carry out unwise public policies
without running afoul of the Constitution. As a Justice of the
Michigan Supreme Court, I often uphold policies that have been
enacted in the state legislature, or by cities and counties and
townships, that I believe are unwise. But lack of wisdom is not the
test for what is or is not constitutional, and lack of wisdom is not
what allows me—a judge, not the adult supervisor of society—to
exercise the enormous power of judicial review and strike down laws
that have been enacted by “we the people” through their elected
representatives. Redress for unwise public policies must generally
come as the product of democratic debate and at the ballot box, not
through judicial correction.
Myth or Misconception 2:
The Constitution principally upholds individual rights and liberties
through the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
It is not to denigrate the
importance of the Bill of Rights to suggest that the Founders
intended that individual rights and liberties would principally be
protected by the architecture of the Constitution—the structure of
government set forth in its original seven articles. The great
animating principles of our Constitution are in evidence everywhere
within this architecture. First, there is federalism, in which the
powers of government are divided between the national government and
the states. To the former belong such powers as those relating to
foreign policy and national defense; to the latter such powers as
those relating to the criminal justice system and the protection of
the family. Second, there is the separation of powers, in which each
branch of the national government—the legislative, the executive,
and the judicial branch—has distinct responsibilities, yet is
subject to the checks and balances of the other branches. Third,
there is the principle of limited government of a particular sort in
which the national government is constrained to exercise only those
powers set forth by the Constitution, for example, issuing currency,
administering immigration laws, running the post office and waging
war. Together, these principles make it more difficult for
government to exercise power and to abuse minority rights, and they
limit the impact of governmental abuses of power.
Many of the Founders, including James Madison, believed that a Bill
of Rights was unnecessary because the Constitution’s architecture
itself was sufficient to ensure that national power would not be
abused. As Alexander Hamilton remarked in Federalist 84, “the
Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful
purpose, a Bill of Rights.” And practically speaking, until 1925,
the Bill of Rights was not even thought to apply to the states, only
to Congress; yet the individual rights of our citizens remained
generally well protected.
Myth or Misconception 3:
The national government and the state governments are regulated
similarly by the Constitution.
As the 10th Amendment makes
clear, the starting point for any constitutional analysis is that
the national, i.e., the federal, government can do nothing under the
Constitution unless it is affirmatively authorized by some provision
of the Constitution. The states, on the other hand, can do anything
under the Constitution unless they are prohibited by some provision
of the Constitution. Why then, one might ask, throughout the 19th
century and well into the 20th century—before the Bill of Rights was
thought to apply to the states—did Michigan and other states not
generally infringe upon such indispensable freedoms as the freedoms
of speech or religion? How were individual rights protected? Well,
in two ways principally: First and most obviously, there was simply
not majority sentiment on the part of the people of Michigan or
other states to encroach upon such freedoms. Second, Michigan and
all other states had their own Constitutions that protected such
freedoms.
Today the Bill of Rights has been construed by the U.S. Supreme
Court to apply to the states, creating more uniform and more
centralized constitutional policy. It remains true, however, that
the impact of the Constitution upon the national and state
governments varies substantially.
Myth or Misconception 4:
Federalism is the same thing as states rights.
“State’s rights” in the
constitutional sense refers to all of the rights of sovereignty
retained by the states under the Constitution. But in this sense,
state’s rights refers to only half of what federalism is, the other
half consisting of those powers either reserved for the national
government or affirmatively prohibited to the states.
In popular use, “state’s rights” has had a checkered history. Before
the Civil War, it was the rallying cry of southern opponents of
proposals to abolish or restrict slavery. By the 20th century, it
had become the watchword of many of those who supported segregation
in the public schools, as well as those who criticized generally the
growing power of the central government.
While I share the view that federal power has come to supplant
“state’s rights” in far too many areas of governmental
responsibility, “state’s rights” are truly rights only where an
examination of the Constitution reveals both that the national
government lacks the authority to act and that there is nothing that
prohibits the state governments from acting. There is no “state
right,” for example, for one state to impose barriers on trade
coming from another, or to establish a separate foreign policy.
These responsibilities are reserved to the national government by
the Constitution.
Myth or Misconception 5:
The Constitution is a document for lawyers and judges.
The Constitution was written for
those in whose name it was cast, “we the people.” It is a relatively
short document, and it is generally straightforward and clear-cut.
With only a few exceptions, there is an absence of legalese or
technical terms. While the contemporary constitutional debate has
focused overwhelmingly on a few broad phrases of the Constitution
such as “due process” and “equal protection,” the overwhelming part
of this document specifies, for example, that a member of the House
of Representatives must be 25 years of age, seven years a citizen,
and an inhabitant of the state from which he is chosen; that a bill
becomes a law when approved by both Houses and signed by the
president, etc. One willing to invest just a bit more time in
understanding the Constitution need only peruse The Federalist
Papers to see what Madison, Hamilton or Jay had to say about its
provisions to a popular audience in the late-18th century.
One reason I believe that the Constitution, as well as our laws
generally, should be interpreted according to the straightforward
meaning of their language, is to maintain the law as an institution
that belongs to all of the people, and not merely to judges and
lawyers. Let me give you an illustration: One creative
constitutional scholar has said that the requirement that the
president shall be at least 35 years of age really means that a
president must have the maturity of a person who was 35 back in 1789
when the Constitution was written. That age today, opines this
scholar, might be 30 or 32 or 40 or 42. The problem is that whenever
a word or phrase of the Constitution is interpreted in such a
“creative” fashion, the Constitution—and the law in general—becomes
less accessible and less comprehensible to ordinary citizens, and
more the exclusive province of attorneys who are trained in knowing
such things as that “35” does not always mean “35.”
One thing, by the way, that is unusual in the constitutional law
course that I teach at Hillsdale College is that we actually read
the language of the Constitution and discuss its provisions as we do
so. What passes for constitutional law study at many colleges and
universities is exclusively the study of Supreme Court decisions.
While such decisions are obviously important, it is also important
to compare what the Supreme Court has said to what the Constitution
says. What is also unusual at Hillsdale is that, by the time
students take my course, they have been required to study such
informing documents as the Declaration of Independence, The
Federalist Papers, Washington’s First Inaugural Address—and, indeed,
the Constitution itself.
Myth or Misconception 6:
The role of the judge in interpreting the Constitution is to do
justice.
The role of a judge is to do
justice under law, a very different concept. Each of us has his or
her own innate sense of right and wrong. This is true of every judge
I have ever met. But judges are not elected or appointed to impose
their personal views of right and wrong upon the legal system.
Rather, as Justice Felix Frankfurter once remarked, “The highest
example of judicial duty is to subordinate one’s personal will and
one’s private views to the law.” The responsible judge must
subordinate his personal sense of justice to the public justice of
our Constitution and its representative and legal institutions.
I recall one judicial confirmation hearing a number of years ago
when I was working for the Senate Judiciary Committee. The nominee
was asked, “If a decision in a particular case was required by law
or statute and yet that offended your conscience, what would you
do?” The nominee answered, “Senator, I have to be honest with you.
If I was faced with a situation like that and it ran against my
conscience, I would follow my conscience.” He went on to explain: “I
was born and raised in this country, and I believe that I am steeped
in its traditions, its mores, its beliefs and its philosophies, and
if I felt strongly in a situation like that, I feel that it would be
the product of my very being and upbringing. I would follow my
conscience.” To my mind, for a judge to render decisions according
to his or her personal conscience rather than the law is itself
unconscionable.
Myth or Misconception 7:
The great debate over the proper judicial role is between judges who
are activist and judges who are restrained.
In the same way that excessively
“activist” judges may exceed the boundaries of the judicial power by
concocting law out of whole cloth, excessively “restrained” judges
may unwarrantedly contract protections and rights conferred by the
laws and the Constitution. It is inappropriate for a judge to
exercise “restraint” when to do so is to neglect his obligation of
judicial review—his obligation to compare the law with the
requirements set forth by the Constitution. Nor am I enamored with
the term “strict construction” to describe the proper duties of the
judge, for it is the role of the judge to interpret the words of the
law reasonably—not “strictly” or “loosely,” not “broadly” or
“narrowly,” just reasonably.
I would prefer to characterize the contemporary judicial debate in
terms of interpretivism verses non-interpretivism. In doing this, I
would borrow the description of the judicial power used by Chief
Justice John Marshall, who 200 years ago in Marbury v. Madison
stated that it is the duty of the judge to say what the law is, not
what it ought to be (which is the province of the legislature). For
the interpretivist, the starting point, and usually the ending
point, in giving meaning to the law are the plain words of the law.
This is true whether we are construing the law of the Constitution,
the law of a statute, or indeed the law of contracts and policies
and deeds. In each instance, it is the duty of the judge to give
faithful meaning to the words of the lawmaker and let the chips fall
where they may.
One prominent illustration of the differing approaches of
interpretivism and non-interpretivism arises in the context of the
constitutionality of capital punishment. Despite the fact that there
are at least six references in the Constitution to the possibility
of capital punishment—for example, both the 5th and 14th Amendments
assert that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law,” from which it can clearly be
inferred that a person can be deprived of these where there is due
process—former Justice William Brennan held, in dissent, that
capital punishment was unconstitutional on the grounds apparently
that, since 1789, there had arisen an “evolving standard of decency
marking the progress of a maturing society” on whose behalf he
spoke. Purporting to speak for “generations yet unborn,” Justice
Brennan substituted his own opinions on capital punishment for the
judgments reached in the Constitution by the Founders. His decision
in this regard is the embodiment, but certainly not the only recent
example, of non-interpretivism.
Myth or Misconception 8:
The Constitution is a living document.
The debate
between interpretivists and non-interpretivists over how to give
meaning to the Constitution is often framed in the following terms:
Is the Constitution a “living” document, in which judges “update”
its provisions according to the “needs” of the times? Or is the
Constitution an enduring document, in which its original meanings
and principles are permanently maintained, subject only to changes
adopted in accordance with its amending clause? I believe that it is
better described in the latter sense. It is beyond dispute, of
course, that the principles of the Constitution must be applied to
new circumstances over time—the Fourth Amendment on searches and
seizures to electronic wiretaps, the First Amendment on freedom of
speech to radio and television and the Internet, the interstate
commerce clause to automobiles and planes, etc. However, that is
distinct from allowing the words and principles themselves to be
altered based upon the preferences of individual judges.
Our Constitution would be an historical artifact—a genuinely dead
letter—if its original sense became irrelevant, to be replaced by
the views of successive waves of judges and justices intent on
“updating” it, or replacing what some judges view as the “dead hand
of the past” with contemporary moral theory. This is precisely what
the Founders sought to avoid when they instituted a “government of
laws, not of men.”
There is no charter of government in the history of mankind that has
more wisely set forth the proper relationship between the governed
and their government than the American Constitution. For those of us
who are committed to constitutional principles and fostering respect
for that document, there is no better homage that we can pay it than
to understand clearly its design and to take care in the manner in
which we describe it. |